ID No.

 Questions

1

What are the possibilities and the limits of the synthetic study of the origins of life?

Synthetic biology deals with the “construction of biological entities which do not exist in nature”. One biological entity that does not exist in nature (any more) is a primitive living cell. We do not have fossil records for very primitive cells and the only way to study them is by constructing realistic supramolecular models that might resemble primitive cells, so that their properties can be discovered, tested, and placed in the context of pre-biological evolution. In this sense, synthetic biology methods are the only available scientific tools to experimentally approach the origins of life.

What are the possible progress and the (current/intrinsic) limits of synthetic biology approaches to the study of the origins of life?

2

Aiming at a universal biology: what can be the contribution of the synthetic methodology?

Despite the fact that we only know life on Earth, we try to produce the foundations of a theoretical biology that should be valid for all possible worlds.

Can research on life based on the synthetic methodology help us to deal with this epistemological paradox? If yes, in what sense and how?

Can the synthetic modeling of life help us to establish whether earthly life is or not a typical case of life?

3

Does the synthetic modeling of life need teleology?

Are teleological principles (e.g., survival or self-maintenance) required for successful synthetic modeling of life?

4

How can we test for artificial life?

What kind of test could be implemented to establish whether an artificial system is living or not? What would be its validity?

Could this analysis be applied to all kind of artificial systems modeling living systems (software, hardware, and wetware systems)?

ID No.

 Questions

5

What can synthetic biology offer to the study of cognition?

Recent advancements in synthetic biology methods, both in vivo and in vitro approaches, make it possible to design, construct and manipulate simple chemical and/or genetic/metabolic circuitry used by cells to sense the environment and react to it. On this basis, synthetic biology is starting to contribute to the exploration of cognition through the construction of artificial models of minimal cognitive systems.

When will a synthetic minimal organism become “intelligent” in terms of minimal cognitive properties?

What is an inevitable biological property for developing  minimal perception and cognition? Could it be conceived as a kind of homeo-dynamics, characterized in terms of a self-regulation mechanism generated by chaotic dynamics (i.e., a sort of extended form of autopoiesis)?

What kind of empirical analysis of artificial systems can be implemented to test for cognitive processes? In particular, is it possible to devise a Turing-like test for minimal organisms built by synthetic biology?

Could it be valid for all artificial systems, that is, systems implemented in software, hardware and wetware?

What are the limits, the possibilities and the implications of this approach to the scientific exploration of cognition?

6

What is the role of embodiment in the synthetic exploration of cognition?

Do we need an artificial (humanoid) body to model and generate, in a synthetic system, levels of natural (human) intelligence?

If yes, would software, hardware and wetware implementations of the artificial body produce different results? Why?

Is there an "appropriate" level of abstraction we should adopt to embody cognitive process? What are the risks associated with the choice of the wrong level?

7

How can one build an agent aware of its environment?

What sensory modalities are imperative for an artificial embodied agent to be “aware” of its environment?

Does this significantly depend on (morphological, material, and/or other features of) the embodiment of the agent?

How can this be shown in a (hardware, software and/or wetware) model?

8

How can we model conscious experience?

How far down the “scale of complexity” does conscious experience go? Does a mouse feel pain, does a bacterium? Could an artificial system?

More precisely: could conscious experience be implemented in hardware, wetware and/or software systems? If not, why? If yes, how?

Is the dichotomy inner/outer, in its different expressions (e.g., internal/external experience), necessary to model (generate) consciousness in artificial systems?

9

The extended mind thesis: can it be explored synthetically?

Current debate proposes a variety of interpretations of the “extended mind” thesis, as well as a variety of criticisms.

Can the synthetic modeling of cognitive processes provide evidence to support or discard the “extended” view(s) of cognitive systems?

How would you set up an experiment in synthetic modeling to test one (ore more) of this view(s)?

ID No.

Questions

10

The “sciences of the artificial” and the “sciences of the natural”: How can we guarantee positive  interaction?

Are there criteria of relevance for synthetic models of living and cognitive processes, or methods for transferring knowledge, that could ensure a successful transmission of knowledge from the “sciences of the artificial” to the “sciences of the natural”?

Do we need a shared language and a common mathematical framework to successfully operate this transmission?

In what sense could this transmission be “successful”?

11

What are the characteristics and roles of synthetic models?

In what sense and under which conditions can artificial systems (i.e., the class of systems including hardware, software and wetware  artificial systems) be considered models of natural living and cognitive processes?

What is their epistemological status? Do they resemble actual experiments or thought experiments or neither?

Under which conditions can they reveal unknown features of living and cognitive processes/systems, and thus lead the scientific research to actually discover these features in natural   processes/systems? Can you think of concrete examples?

12

Do different forms of the synthetic modeling have different explanatory powers?

Do software, hardware and wetware synthetic approaches entail conceptually different kinds of models of natural processes (e.g., embodied/un-embodied models; simulations, functional analogues, realizations, etc. of the explored processes)?

If yes, would they have a different explanatory power for different classes of target phenomena?

(For example, what is the explanatory power of un-embodied models with regard to embodied phenomena?)

Which are the challenges that require the combination of software, hardware and wetware synthetic approaches?

Are there examples of effective and fruitful coordination of these approaches in the exploration of natural living and/or cognitive processes? How would you set up such a coordination, and in relation to which target?

13

Whichlevels of abstraction are appropriate in the synthetic modeling of life and cognition?

Contemporary technology poses limitations on the type and complexity of the physical models that we can build either in simulation or in real systems. Even the most sophisticated robots are quite far from achieving the complexity of human beings. Materials and actuators used in engineering have properties that are far from those that characterize biological systems. Computation is also profoundly different. Computers use transistors and precise clocks to process and transfer information, while biological systems employ networks of neurons in which information travels in spikes. These differences become more relevant as the complexity of the system we are trying to model increases (e.g. we can model single neurons, small networks of neurons, single muscles but we are forced to use traditional computers to actuate a humanoid robot). Is there a "correct" level of abstraction we should adopt when pursuing a synthetic methodology? What are the risks associated with the choice of the wrong level?

14

What are the impacts of the synthetic methodology on the dichotomies 'science/engineering', and 'artificial/natural'?

The synthetic methodology asks the scientific observer to study natural processes by actively building the objects of her exploration.

Has the resulting scientific research to be understood as a genuine form of science, or as a form of engineering? According to your answer, what is the difference between science and engineering?

And how can we draw a line between natural and artificial systems?

15

The synthetic methodology: What are the environmental and social impacts?

One of the implications of the development of the synthetic modeling of life and cognition is the introduction of  synthetic agents endowed with biological and/or cognitive properties into our environmental and social ecologies. What are the risks, and what the possible advantages, of the related transformations of these ecologies?